Volume 5 - Issue 4
Empowering Personal Health Records with Cloud Computing
- Clementine Gritti
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research School of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Wollongong, Australia
cjpg967@uowmail.edu.au
- Willy Susilo
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research School of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Wollongong, Australia
wsusilo@edu.au
- Thomas Plantard
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research School of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Wollongong, Australia
thomaspl.edu.au
- Kaitai Liang
Department of Information and Computer Science, Aalto University, Finland
kaitai.liang@aalto.fi
- Duncan S. Wong
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
duncan@cityu.edu.hk
Keywords: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, Proxy Re-Encryption, Online/Offline encryption, CCA security.
Abstract
The issue of empowering patients to be well informed with regards to their health records has been
well accepted in the community, which is known as the Personal Health Record (PHR). PHR has been
believed as the solution for better management of an individual’s health, and as the tool that will empower
the patient in correlation with healthcare providers through the ability to provide his/her own
medical history. In this work, we aim to take one step further by equipping patients with the ability
to “control” the access to their PHR efficiently and easily, by incorporating the emerging cloud technology.
Specifically, we aim to provide the patients with the luxury of using the power of the cloud
to conduct the outsourced work efficiently. To realize this, we present the notion of online/offline
ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme, which is very useful primitive in empowering
personal health records in cloud computing. We present such a notion as well as a set of
security requirements. More specifically, we define two security models covering both outsider and
insider attacks. Furthermore, we present a concrete construction of such a scheme, and prove that it
is secure under the well known complexity assumptions and following our security models.