Volume 5 - Issue 1
Supporting Common Criteria Security Analysis with Problem Frames
- Kristian Beckers
paluno University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
kristian.beckers@uni-due.de
- Maritta Heisel
paluno University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
maritta.heisel@uni-due.de
- Denis Hatebur
Institute for Technical Systems GmbH, Germany
d.hatebur@itesys.de
Keywords: common criteria, problem frames, security standards, document generation, security requirements engineering
Abstract
Security standards, e.g., the Common Criteria (ISO 15408), are applied by software vendors
to establish a level of confidence that the security functionality of their products and their
applied assurance measures are sufficient. To get a Common Criteria certification, a comprehensible
set of documents is necessary, including a detailed threat analysis and security
objective elicitation. We focus on improving the Common Criteria threat analysis and the
derivation of security objectives in our work.
Our method is based upon an attacker model, which considers different attacker types,
e.g., software attackers, that threaten only specific parts of a system. We provide tool support
for checking the consistency and the completeness of the specified software systems
using OCL expressions. For example, we check if all types of attackers have been considered
for a specific domain, we check for all software domains that either a software attacker is
considered or an assumption is documented that excludes software attackers, and we check
if all threats are addressed by security objectives. Moreover, we can generate tables and
texts from our UML models to satisfy the Common Criteria documentation demands. For
instance, we can generate Common Criteria specific cross-table, which maps every security
objective and assumption to a specific threat. The consistency checks are integrated in our
structured method for threat analysis that considers the Common Criteria’s (CC) demands
for documentation of the system in its environment and the reasoning that all threats are
discovered and addressed. With our support tool UML4PF (that extends a UML tool and
contains e.g., a UML profile and an OCL validator), we support security reasoning, validation
of models, and we are able to generate Common Criteria-compliant documentation
using model-to-text transformations. Our threat analysis method can also be used for threat
analysis without the common criteria, because it uses a specific part of the UML profile that
can be adapted to other demands with little effort. For example, it could be adapted for
other security standards like ISO 27001. We illustrate our approach with the development
of a smart metering gateway system.