Volume 3 - Issue 1 – 2
Security Analysis of Oine E-cash Systems with Malicious Insider
- Takashi Nishide
Kyushu University Fukuoka, Japan
nishide@inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp
- Shingo Miyazaki
Toshiba Solutions Tokyo, Japan
Miyazaki.Shingo@toshiba-sol.co.jp
- Kouichi Sakurai
Kyushu University Fukuoka, Japan
sakurai@inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp
Keywords: Chaum-Fiat-Naor paradigm, double spending, electronic cash system, framing attack by bank, insider threat
Abstract
When we build electronic cash systems, the main focus of the design is usually on preventing customers’
malicious actions. However, since authorities such as banks and certificate authorities may
have important secret data of customers, the insiders in the potentially untrusted authorities can become
threats to electronic cash systems. Miyazaki and Sakurai [2] first systematically analyzed security
of oine anonymous electronic cash systems by considering the insider threats from untrusted
authorities. They investigated the security of the existing electronic cash systems and categorized
the systems into four types. In this paper, we reconsider the security of oine anonymous electronic
cash systems including more recent systems based on the classification of Miyazaki and Sakurai and
investigate the possible eective countermeasures against malicious insiders.