Volume 1 - Issue 1
Using Budget-Based Access Control to Manage Operational Risks Caused by Insiders
- Debin Liu
School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University
deliu@umail.iu.edu
- L. Jean Camp
School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University
- XiaoFeng Wang
School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University
- Lusha Wang
School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University
Keywords: Insider Threat, Access Control, Risk Management, Incentive Engineering, Human- Subject Experiment
Abstract
The insider threat has been framed as protection of the network from insiders whose threat level
may be unknown to the organization. In this paper, we propose a Budget-Based Access Control
Model to mitigate the insider threat. We provide an order of magnitude price for every access right
and assign each individual user a risk budget. The price for access is then personalized based on the
observed historical behavior of the user. The risk budget represents the amount of risks an organization
can tolerate from that employee. Each access right of a user may cost him certain risk points. The
incentives come in the forms of punishments and rewards. The punishments are triggered by the risk
budget exhaustion. On the other hand, those whose risk behavior is aligned with the organization’s
risk preferences will be rewarded. The human-subject experimental results demonstrate our model’s
positive influence on the users’ risk behavior. In addition, this work is distinguished from previous
risk-based access controls by our modeling of users behaviors, prevention of risk point hoarding and
provision of explicit pricing. All risk-based access inherently constrains behavior incentives.